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To accept a theory is to make a commitment, 
a commitment to the further confrontation 
of new phenomena within 
the framework of that theory . . . and a 
wager that all relevant phenomena can 
be accounted for without giving up that 
theory. Commitments are not true or 
false; they are vindicated or not vindicated 
in the course of human history. 
—Bas C. van Fraassen, 
The Scientific Image 
 
In her book Science as Social Knowledge, Helen Longino argued 
not only that social values are in fact ineliminable from theory choice in 
science but also that we ought to rewrite our ideals in such a way as to 
incorporate this fact. One of the most common criticisms one hears of 
this idea of granting a legitimate role for social values in theory choice 
in science is that it just doesn’t make sense to regard social preferences 
as relevant to the truth or to the way things are. “What is at issue,” wrote 
Susan Haack, is “whether it is possible to derive an ‘is’ from an ‘ought.’ ” 
One can see that this is not possible, she concludes, “as soon as one expresses 
it plainly: that propositions about what states of affairs are desirable 
or deplorable could be evidence that things are, or are not, so” 
(Haack 1993a, 35, emphasis in original). Haack does not provide an argument 
for the view that it is impossible to derive an is from an ought, 
but the intuition she expresses is strong and widespread. The purpose of 
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this chapter is not to determine whether this view is correct but rather to 
show that even if we grant it (which I do), we may still consistently believe 
that social values have a legitimate role in theory choice in science. 
I will defend this conclusion by outlining a view about social values 
and theory choice that is based on the constructive empiricism (CE) of 
Bas van Fraassen. Some questions about what role social values may 
legitimately play in science look different, I contend, depending on 
whether they are viewed from a realist perspective, according to which 
the aim of science is literally true description of reality, or from the 
point of view of a constructive empiricist antirealism, according to 
which the aim of science is empirical adequacy, the fit of a theory to the 
observables.1 In Longino’s account of the role of social values in science, 
she expressed what appears to be a realist view when articulating 
one of the goals she took science to have: 
  
 My concern in this study is with a scientific practice perceived as having 
 true or representative accounts of its subject matter as a primary 
 goal or good. When we are troubled about the role of contextual values 
 or value-laden assumptions in science, it is because we are thinking 
 of scientific inquiry as an activity whose intended outcome is an 
 accurate understanding of whatever structures and processes are being 
 investigated. (Longino 1990, 36) 
 
Consequently, when Longino went on to argue that social values had to 
play a role in deciding between theories because one had to choose 
with insufficient evidence which auxiliary assumptions to adopt in order 
to have any view about which evidence was relevant to a theory, she 
appeared to step just where Haack insists we must not. She appeared to 
commit herself to the view that social preferences could play the role of 
reasons to believe an assumption was true, or at least could make adoption 
of an assumption legitimate. 
 
As I develop CE in what I take to be the most natural way toward a 
view of the role of social values in theory choice, it will become clear 
that there is a sense in which the view I describe is different from, and 
not consistent with, Longino’s 1990 view. Nevertheless, the conclusion I 
draw, that social values indeed may have a legitimate role in theory 
choice, is obviously a defense of part of Longino’s overall claim. After 
defending CE’s solution to the problem of social values in theory choice 
against some obvious objections, I will argue that an attractive realist 
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way of attempting to achieve something similar is not successful. This 
suggests that CE may be the only way to grant a legitimate role to social 
values in theory choice without falling prey to Haack’s objection. 
 
 
8.1 Limitations of the Objection 
It goes without saying that social values are often involved in the decisions 
we make, consciously and unconsciously, about which subjects 
to inquire into and which questions to ask, and often legitimately so. 
Haack’s objection that an ought does not imply an is does not undermine 
the legitimacy of social values playing a role in determining which 
things we learn about the world, nor does Haack think it does. But the 
relevance of Haack’s criticism to the sorts of matters those writing about 
social values and science are concerned about is narrower still. The 
force of Haack’s objection can be maintained only if it is stated pretty 
much exactly as she has put it: Preferences that a thing be so cannot be 
evidence that it is so, or a reason to think it is so. There are claims that 
sound similar but are found on inspection to be indefensible. For example, 
we might have thought Haack said that the way we want things to 
be cannot be relevant to the way things are (as I stated the matter in my 
opening sentence). But this is manifestly false if the “things” referred to 
are themselves social things, to take the easiest case; our preferences are 
the reasons many social things are as they are, though not alone reasons 
to think they are as they are. And the way we want things to be is clearly 
to some extent relevant to the way they will be in the future, even with 
nonsocial nature. 
 
We might have thought Haack’s objection was the same as saying 
that social values cannot be epistemically relevant. But if it were, then it 
would be wrong, because everyone knows that social values can introduce 
bias and that bias is relevant to whether we have good epistemic 
reasons. Finally, it must surely be acknowledged that the social structure 
of a community is relevant to how successful its members will be in 
finding correct answers to their questions. To take an extreme case, if 
the social structure of a community was such that everyone believed on 
authority the views of a certain individual rather than investigating any 
claims on their own, then it would be less likely that this community 
would find good answers to questions about the world than it is for a 
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community of independent and interacting investigators. Social structures 
can embody social values that are also epistemic values, though 
the way they function as epistemic values is in governing practices, not 
directly as reasons to believe a certain theory is true. Because they have 
an epistemic role to play, and epistemic questions are constitutive of science 
on anyone’s view, that these sorts of social values have a function 
in science does not need to be defended by the sort of view I am developing. 
To summarize, some of the most discussed ways in which social 
values might be relevant to science do not fall prey to Haack’s objection; 
I will focus on those that do. 
 
 
8.2 Social Values in Theory Choice 
According to the constructive empiricist, accepting a theory need not 
and should not involve believing that it is true. That is, it need not and 
should not involve believing that the theory’s claims about all types of 
things—observable and unobservable—are correct. Accepting a theory 
should involve believing only that it is empirically adequate, that is, believing 
that it fits all observable phenomena, those we have actually observed 
and those we have not. The source of the flexibility about theory 
choice that I find in CE lies in the following two aspects of the view: 
(1) For a given domain, there is only one true theory, whereas there are 
in general many empirically adequate ones (whether we can imagine 
them or not). This follows roughly from the meanings of the terms. 
(2) On this view, virtues of a theory that go beyond consistency, empirical 
adequacy, and empirical strength do not concern the relation between 
the theory and the world; “they provide reasons to prefer the theory 
independently of questions of truth” (van Fraassen 1980, 88). On this 
admittedly controversial view, there isn’t any kind of evidence we could 
get that would make it more rational to think a theory was true than to 
think it was empirically adequate. So, since when we might be wrong 
we should be wary of making ourselves wrong about more things by believing 
stronger claims, we are better off restricting our beliefs about 
theories to claims of empirical adequacy. 
 
On standard assumptions about truth, there is at most one theory 
that is true of a given domain up to notational variation, and therefore at 
most one theory that it would be correct to believe, because believing, 
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for van Fraassen at least, means believing true. However, there are many 
theories about a domain, including many we have not thought of, that 
we would be within our epistemic rights to accept, in van Fraassen’s 
sense of acceptance, because there are potentially many theories that 
are empirically adequate, true to all observables, in a domain.2 For the 
constructive empiricist, social values can legitimately play a role in 
grounding choices among theories when these are choices among theories 
all of which are legitimately believed at a given time to be empirically 
adequate, because the choice of one among these theories is a 
pragmatic affair. 
 
Constructive empiricism is not as it stands a methodological view 
that would tell us how to decide which theories are empirically adequate 
or how to choose between candidate theories. Nevertheless, it has 
some framing implications for these questions, because it involves a 
view about what we ought to be doing when we choose a theory, namely, 
believing that it is empirically adequate on epistemic grounds and preferring 
it to any rival in the same domain that we also believe to be empirically 
adequate, on pragmatic grounds that have nothing to do with 
correspondence between the theory and the world. It follows, crucially, 
that if we were faced with rival theories that according to our present evidence, 
both appeared to be empirically adequate, choosing between 
them would not be a choice of which theory we should believe to be 
true. Because we would not be choosing which one to believe true, a 
fortiori we would not be choosing which one to believe true on the basis 
of social values. Thus, if social values were among the pragmatic 
grounds we appealed to in choosing among theories we believed to be 
empirically adequate, we would not be committing the fallacy Haack 
inveighs against. And on this way of placing social values in the activity 
of theory choice, the possibility that social values (one sort of pragmatic 
factor) would be a reason to think a theory empirically adequate does 
not arise. It is assumed that the criteria for judging empirical adequacy 
are thoroughly epistemic, as they should be—taking the lesson of Haack’s 
objection—because a theory is empirically adequate just in case what it 
says about observables is true. 
 
It is illuminating to compare this view with Longino’s (1990) picture 
of why social values are ineliminable from theory choice. There, 
social values enter into our judgment not after all current evidence is 
tallied in the columns of the appropriate hypotheses but before this 
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tallying and as a precondition.3 Following the bootstrap model of confirmation, 
Longino concludes that confirmation is relative to auxiliary assumptions 
or, in words that even a nonbootstrapper could accept, that it 
is only by means of auxiliary assumptions that the relevance of evidence 
to a hypothesis can be judged. To require these auxiliaries to be “directly” 
confirmed—that is, confirmed without reliance on further auxiliaries— 
would be, according to Longino, to place unreasonable constraints on 
science that would disqualify much of the science we admire.4 It would 
be feasible, she submits, only for “theories” that expressed nothing more 
than relationships between observables, and our sophisticated science 
does not look like that. We should require, she thinks, only that auxiliaries 
be “indirectly” confirmed, an option that allows the influence of 
interests and values to enter into theory choice through the choice of 
auxiliary assumptions (Longino 1990, 51–52). 
 
Constructive empiricism looks like a solution to at least part of 
Longino’s worry. It does not, and according to van Fraassen does not 
need to, place any restriction on scientific theorizing. Our constructed 
hypotheses may be as elaborate as we please; elaborate theories can 
have pragmatic significance, and searching for them may even be our 
most effective way of producing empirically adequate theories. However, 
because what we take from theories (and auxiliary assumptions) 
epistemically is only their observable consequences, their observable 
consequences are also the only parts of them that need confirmation. 
And according to Longino, as well as to CE, the observable consequences 
are more likely to be susceptible to “direct” confirmation than other 
parts of a theory are. There may be further questions about whether CE 
can sustain this focus on observables without undermining the rationale 
for elaborate theories, but maintaining both is the advertised view, and 
it should seem attractive to anyone who has been impressed by Longino’s 
reflections. 
 
It seems to me that if Longino’s claim that we should require only 
indirect confirmation of auxiliaries can be defended in case the aim of 
science is truth, then it can also be defended in case that aim is empirical 
adequacy. Those who aim for empirically adequate theories face 
the incompleteness of their evidence no less than do seekers after true 
theories, because our actual observations do not add up to all of the observables. 
And if the seeker of true theories must appeal to auxiliary assumptions 
to show that evidence is relevant to a theory, then so must the 
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seeker after theories that are empirically adequate, because the latter is 
equally obligated to link the theories to observables. However, because 
empirical adequacy is truth for observables, we cannot accept a claim 
that social values can be reasons for believing in the empirical adequacy 
of a theory—on pain of the fallacy I began with—and likewise we cannot 
accept that they can be reasons for believing auxiliary assumptions 
(are empirically adequate or wholly true) either. Longino’s argument 
applies to empirical adequacy as it does to truth, but its conclusion is 
unacceptable if that conclusion is stated as I have just done. In this 
sense, the account I am sketching is at odds with Longino’s (1990) view. 
 
This tension between the view I am describing and what appears to 
be Longino’s view arises from the impression her 1990 discussion creates 
that social values are being substituted for evidence and the consequent 
impression that we are relaxing an epistemic standard when we 
allow social values to play a role in theory choice. However, something 
of a rapprochement between the two views is possible, partly because, 
though I think the reading I have given Longino’s discussion is the natural 
one, she does not explicitly commit herself to the view that social 
values are to be reasons to believe auxiliary assumptions. Moreover, 
there is a constructive empiricist way of fleshing out some of what she 
does say that escapes that formulation and provides an ersatz version 
of what she has claimed. Longino has rejected the constructive empiricist 
option I am presenting, for reasons I will elaborate and make some 
replies to.5 
 
Notice that an auxiliary assumption is a claim about the world, just 
as a theory is, so constructive empiricists aim for any such assumption 
they accept to be empirically adequate. If two such assumptions have 
equal amounts of (incomplete) evidence for the claim that they are empirically 
adequate, and neither is falsified, then they can legitimately 
base a choice in favor of either on social values. Crucially, such a choice 
will not be an indication that they believe either assumption to be true, 
or even more empirically adequate, than the other. It will be a choice to 
accept and work with one rather than the other for pragmatic reasons, 
and it will be a choice that should be revised in light of new evidence 
that shows the assumption is in fact unlikely to be empirically adequate. 
Because empirical adequacy requires only fit with observables, it 
can be not only that more than one theory is empirically adequate for a 
domain but also that more than one auxiliary is empirically adequate 
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for a domain. (Of course, not all auxiliaries involve unobservables, but 
some do.) When our evidence is incomplete, more than one theory or 
auxiliary may appear to be empirically adequate. In such a circumstance, 
epistemic considerations would leave us indifferent, in a tie that 
pragmatic considerations like social values could legitimately break, in 
a decision that is nevertheless not about which theory or assumption to 
believe. Thus the tiebreaker use of social preferences works just the 
same for auxiliaries as it does for theories themselves. With Longino, I 
can say that it can be legitimate to use social values to decide which 
auxiliary to accept. Moreover, because which auxiliary one accepts decides 
which evidence is relevant to a hypothesis, this means that social 
values can have a role in the preconditions for evaluating evidence. 
However, that role is not reason to believe an auxiliary assumption, and 
on the CE view, it should never be the case that social values are deployed 
in deciding which statement to accept before our current epistemic 
resources on that question are exhausted. This is the precise sense 
of my commitment here to not condoning the entry of social values before, 
or as a precondition of, epistemic evaluation. 
 
The ideal I describe demands pure epistemic judgments before social 
values can be legitimately taken into account in judging auxiliaries. 
Admittedly, there is a sense in which on the CE view the subsequent 
judgment of whether evidence favors a hypothesis will have involved social 
values, insofar as social values may have played a role in the choice 
of the auxiliary that determined which evidence we hold a hypothesis 
up to. Nevertheless, neither in that choice nor in the subsequent judgment 
of the hypothesis do social values act as a reason to believe a statement: 
The subsequent epistemic judgment is whether given the chosen 
auxiliary, the hypothesis is confirmed by the thereby chosen evidence. 
Thus, the view allows that social values have a legitimate role in theory 
choice, both in the choice of auxiliaries and in the choice of hypothesis, 
but at every stage it demands pure epistemic judgments first. The priority 
of pure epistemic judgments is both conceptual and temporal, because 
our epistemic resources at a given time must be exhausted for the 
limits on our pragmatic options to be determinate. 
 
Longino rejects this way of saving her view from the Haack objection, 
for two reasons. One is that she is not sympathetic to antirealism, a 
doctrine that, like other controversial aspects of CE, it is not within the 
scope of this chapter to defend. The other reason is disagreement with 
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the demand that epistemic and social considerations be strictly separated, 
that is, that epistemic judgments about auxiliaries (or anything 
else) be pure, and that only after we have exhausted our resources for 
them at a given time should social values have a role in our choice of 
hypothesis. The view I am describing does not accord a place to a claim 
that it is, in part, the very point of Longino’s view to make sense of, 
namely, that it is unrealistic to expect epistemic judgments leading to 
theory choice to be devoid of social values. Thus, there is a sense in 
which the way that I have defended the overall Longino view, making it 
palatable via CE, is giving up her most important claim. 
 
This claim needs to be taken seriously, I grant, at least for the human 
sciences, because it is a response to the way these sciences actually 
behave, and I think to a recognition that there are limits to the capacity 
of an individual epistemic subject to be conscious of, much less actively 
engaged in scrutinizing, the assumptions that come to him or her in 
virtue of participation in a given society, at a given place in that society. 
 
However, I differ from Longino in my response to scientists’ failures to 
actually maintain clear distinctions between evidence and social values 
as reasons to accept hypotheses. First, as mentioned earlier, if we are 
constructive empiricists, then a demand that we “directly” confirm assumptions 
that we make epistemic commitments to is more realistic 
than that same demand is for realists, because we make epistemic commitments 
only to claims about observables. At least, the demand in question 
is more realistic according to the constructive empiricist. This constructive 
empiricist response to worries about our capacity to confirm theories 
directly (i.e., without relying on social values) differs from Longino’s in 
that it opts to restrict what we take as the epistemic goal of science to 
fewer truths, rather than alter or weaken any epistemic standard for 
achieving truths. 
 
Second, while Longino is right that effective scrutiny of auxiliary 
assumptions requires more than that the individual think hard, have 
good intentions, and follow the best methodological rules, I do not 
think this claim is incompatible with maintaining the highest epistemic 
demands on individuals. Because the values that seep into our choices 
of auxiliaries can be social, their scrutiny requires that the scientific 
community meet a number of criteria that ensure that genuine criticism 
is happening at the level of social units, that is, communities. To have 
objective scrutiny of community-level social values requires interactions 
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between communities that qualify as critical, and so on. Let me call this 
the socialist view of the regulation of epistemic choices. I will call the 
view that is implicit in the constructive empiricist’s demand that epistemic 
reasons and commitments be kept distinct from pragmatic reasons 
and commitments the individualist view because reasons and commitments 
are had by individuals in the first place. 
 
Political connotations of these terms notwithstanding, I regard the 
individualist and the socialist views as compatible and complementary, 
because the socialist view does not undermine the idea that epistemic 
purity should be demanded of individuals, and the individualist demand 
does not rule out the appropriateness of regulation at the social level. 
One may worry that accepting the socialist point does undermine the individualist 
ideal because making demands on the social aspects of a community 
appears to be motivated by an acknowledgment that the individual 
cannot be epistemically pure. Relatedly, one might think that if people 
actually followed the individualist ideal, then the socialist ideal would 
be otiose. It is not clear to me that the second claim is true because there 
are ways in which legitimacy can be conferred on a theory through actions 
or events that no individual person could be held accountable for; 
think of the verdicts of committees and funding agencies. 
 
What of the first worry, that the socialist ideal undermines the individualist 
ideal? An easy way out of the bind is to regard ideals we want to 
impose on the social functioning of a scientific community as, in part, 
rules of application of the individualist ideal. The motivation for this 
would be the idea that the individual needs help, and can be helped, in 
achieving the individualist ideal, and this help is supplied by incentive 
structures at the social level. This scheme would have us regard the imposition 
of social standards as, at least, a method for achieving the individualist 
ideal, something we must do in order to improve our chances 
of achieving the individualist ideal. On this view, the legitimacy of the 
individualist ideal and an expectation of achieving it, far from being incompatible 
with the imposition of social standards, is one of the reasons 
for that imposition. 
 
If the second claim, that proper behavior at the individual level 
would render social regulation otiose, is not true, then that provides a 
further, independent reason to call for social ideals in addition to individual 
ideals. The idea here would be that we can imagine every individual’s 
behavior as being above reproach and yet the results of research 
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turning out prejudiced because of effects that can perhaps be regulated 
only at the level of the larger group. For example, it is hardly an actionable 
offense for an individual male committee member on a given occasion 
to ignore an individual female committee member when she 
speaks. We all daydream once in a while. However, if all male committee 
members ignored all female committee members whenever they 
spoke, then I think it is fair to say we would have a potentially prejudicing 
phenomenon that might require action at the level of the group. 
 
To avoid apparent tensions between individual and social ideals, one 
might also further refine individual ideals. For example, the requirement 
that an individual’s epistemic judgments be pure might be refined to the 
weaker requirement that individuals have a disposition to regard their 
views as illegitimate upon becoming aware that they have confused epistemic 
and pragmatic reasons in them, as well as a disposition to become 
so aware. This ideal would arguably be achievable by an individual, but 
its achievement would not make social ideals otiose, because what an individual 
can become aware of is quite limited. In general, it seems to me 
that far from social and individual ideals being incompatible or mutually 
undermining, individuals actually need favorable social structures to have 
any hope of achieving individual ideals. 
However the details may come out, it seems to me that a high probability 
that people will not in fact attain a (certain formulation of ) an 
ideal is not by itself reason to give up the ideal. And an ideal is especially 
worth keeping if what people do achieve by means of aspiring to it is 
worthwhile. What we achieve by means of what I have called the individualist 
ideal is admittedly a topic of disagreement. Some feminists 
have counseled rejection of this ideal for what I think is the following 
reason: The existence of this ideal lulls people into believing they have 
achieved it when they are aware of no blatant prejudice, and this makes 
the ideal actively detrimental because prejudices that have a social life 
are often invisible. 
 
This concern is quite legitimate, but I think that the best response 
to this concern is to strengthen awareness of the social aspects of a scientific 
community that make it critical or prejudiced, and relatedly to 
educate people about the fact that socially conditioned prejudice will 
not necessarily be obvious and may not be visible even to the wellmeaning 
individual. So, I do not think that this concern gives us reason 
to give up an ideal that demands epistemic purity of the individual. The 
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reason not to give up the ideal is clear: There are plenty of prejudices 
that are visible or easily accessible to an individual’s consciousness, and 
there is no excuse for not demanding that each of us contend responsibly 
with those, and keep our eyes open to others. 
 
 
8.3 Objections to the Constructive Empiricist Solution 
 
The CE conception I have described as a response to Haack’s objection 
may sound fine in abstraction, but we may wonder whether it fits the 
way we actually see social values at work in science. Given how difficult 
it is to find even one empirically adequate theory for a domain, how often 
are we faced with two such theories between which pragmatic factors 
that we can recognize as the social values authors like Longino have 
lately called attention to will have the opportunity to be tiebreakers? 
 
First, the need for a tiebreaker does not depend on two theories actually 
being empirically adequate but rather on our having some evidence that 
they are and (in the best case) no evidence that they are not. Second, 
the CE-based view I am articulating does not limit the situations in 
which we may appeal to pragmatic factors to cases of tiebreaking, a 
topic I will postpone to the last part of this section. 
 
For now, note that apparent ties do happen in just the domains that 
have been discussed as most susceptible to the influence of social values. 
One of the most discussed cases of the intrusion of social values 
into theory choice at the time of Longino’s book involved the “man-thehunter” 
and “woman-the-gatherer” hypotheses of how the most distinctively 
human traits evolved in our species. To the question both perspectives 
regarded as pivotal about how the use of tools developed in the 
species, the hypotheses each have a plausible answer. On one account, 
male hunting provided the conditions under which having tools and cooperation 
gave an evolutionary advantage, and the advantage afforded 
by spears provided the reason that the size of the canine teeth could decrease 
at a certain point in time and allow humans to take advantage of 
diets requiring more effective molars. On the gynecentric account, the 
development of tool use was a response to the nutritional stress women 
faced as abundant forests were replaced by grasslands in which food was 
further afield, and as the conditions of reproduction changed to include 
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longer human infancy and dependency. The nutritional stress of females 
was greater than that of males because females fed their young 
through pregnancy, lactation, and beyond. Tool use on this account developed 
much earlier than the stone implements used in hunting, as 
women fashioned organic materials into objects for digging for, carrying, 
and preparing foods. As for the changes in human teeth, female 
sexual choice of more sociable partners can explain the decline in the 
number of males with the most aggressive-looking canines. Thus ingenuity 
began with the women of the species (Longino 1990, 106–8). 
 
Both hypotheses speculated beyond the data we had, but I see no 
obstacle to our understanding them as possible accounts of the data we 
had. I do not have to be a partisan of the man-the-hunter view to be able 
to see that that hypothesis, along with its auxiliaries, will predict much 
of the evidence we have found, and I do not have to be a partisan of the 
woman-the-gatherer view to admit that, taken with the auxiliaries that 
sustain its relation to evidence, this hypothesis fit the observed observables 
at least as well as (and probably better than) its rival. What we have 
in this case is two hypotheses that the evidence at the time suggested 
were both empirically adequate. Thus, on the CE account, one might 
have legitimately thrown one’s commitment behind one or the other of 
these two hypotheses on the pragmatic grounds that one or the other was 
in line with one’s social values. One would not thereby have believed 
that the hypothesis preferred was true, and this last step would not have 
provided the grounds one had for believing the account to be empirically 
adequate. But one might have made a legitimate choice to accept 
one or the other hypothesis all the same. 
 
I will consider the next two objections together. Although they 
come from opposite sides, my answers to the two are related. First, I can 
imagine someone worrying that although I have incorporated social values 
into theory choice, the fact that the choices I allow to be based on 
social values come after, and not as integral to, epistemic judgments 
and have nothing to do with truth, whether about unobservables or 
about observables, trivializes the role of social values in theory choice. 
The second objection, which Haack has made to Longino’s account, 
says that the situation I consider, where two rival hypotheses are running 
neck and neck as far as empirical adequacy judgments are concerned, 
is one where we have no right to make a choice at all because 
the evidence is insufficient to distinguish the rivals (Haack 1993a, 35). 
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The first thing to say about the first of these objections is that 
choices made on the basis of social values with the purpose of furthering 
social ends are trivial only if the social ends are trivial. A theory 
need not correspond with reality for its ideas and stories to have social 
effects—effects that we may or may not think it is good to promote. 
Moreover, people may regard the pictures and stories that a theory contains 
about unobservable items as true when some part of the scientific 
community accepts the theory, even if (or, on the account I am sketching, 
though) that is not the enlightened attitude to take toward an accepted 
theory, and even if it is not the attitude scientists actually take. It 
is legitimate, and not trivial, that we weigh the consequences of such 
takings to be true by the society at large when we make a pragmatic decision 
about whether to accept a theory that passes epistemic muster as 
far as we know. 
 
The first thing to say about Haack’s objection—that we have no 
right to make a choice at all in case of ties—is that although it would be 
well-suited to address someone whose claim entailed that social values 
could be a reason to think that one of these tied theories was true, it can 
gain no traction against the position I am describing. Constructive Empiricism 
grants that choices about whether one theory is closer to the 
truth or even more empirically adequate than another must be based on 
evidence and that we have no right to make a choice about such an 
epistemic matter when the evidence is (roughly) equal for two rivals. 
 
However, the choice between two epistemically tied rivals that according 
to CE we legitimately make after the evidence is in is not a choice 
about which theory is closer to the truth, is more empirically adequate, 
or has more evidence in its favor. It is a choice about which theory 
serves better our practical goals, including social goals. And I see no reason 
to think that two theories whose evidence makes them equally compelling 
will necessarily be such that which theory we decide to work 
with makes no difference to social goals, or such that no one could find 
social reasons to prefer the one to the other. Whether a theory makes 
much difference to any social goals does depend on its subject matter 
but surely not in general on how it stands epistemically when compared 
with its rivals. 
 
It may be that Haack’s intention was to submit that when two theories 
are tied epistemically we have no legitimate grounds to do anything— 
including promotion of social goals—with either one. However, this 
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claim would be far harder to defend than the claim that social preferences 
cannot be grounds for epistemic choices, and it is not a claim she 
even tries to defend. Surely, if the positive evidence in favor of the empirical 
adequacy of the theories is sufficiently great, then we have a right 
to use either theory on observables to serve our practical ends, where 
what is “sufficiently great” will depend on the level of reliability the 
practical goals demand. We are well acquainted with the shortcomings 
of Ptolemy’s model of the heavens, but astronomers use the model to 
this day because it is the best tool for many calculations of things around 
the solar system. However, even leaving social goals aside, we would have 
to reject the claim that we have no right to do anything with epistemically 
tied theories because of its long-term consequences for achievement of 
the epistemic goals of science, a concern that Longino’s call for a more 
realistic epistemology has taken very seriously.6 
 
This is because two theories that are tied according to our present 
evidence may not actually be empirically equivalent, even if our evidence 
so far suggests that both are empirically adequate. Obviously, the 
two theories may coincide in what they say about the things we have in 
fact observed, without coinciding in what they say about everything that 
is observable. (I am assuming that our evidence comes only from observables.) 
It can be, further, that we simply do not know whether the 
two theories coincide in what they predict about all observables. A general 
proof of the empirical equivalence of two theories is sometimes possible 
when the theories are axiomatized and mathematical but not as 
readily available with the sorts of hypotheses that tend to have the most 
relevance to social values. In such a case, only subsequent development 
of the theories would tell us whether they are empirically distinguishable. 
 
Further research may be the only route to finding out not only 
whether two hypotheses are empirically distinguishable but also exactly 
how each can be linked to observables. Kant thought the question 
whether the universe was finite or infinite in space and time was an unresolvable 
antinomy of reason, but now we understand how these questions 
are linked to claims that are empirically testable. Some seem 
ready to believe that nothing that could be observed would distinguish 
the man-the-hunter from the woman-the-gatherer view of human evolution 
(Haack 1993b, 35), but this is something we do not know and 
should be wary of assuming. I doubt that most of us thought we would be 
able to distinguish summer and winter seasonal temperature variations 
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for periods 34 million years ago, that is, to find observational evidence 
that could be linked to a cooling trend in the winters that was not present 
in the summers. (Weather, like behavior, is evanescent after all.) 
But recently a method has been found to make such distinctions via 
variations in the ear stones found in a certain species of Gulf Coast fish 
that survived the mass extinction of that era (Ivany et al. 2000). Human 
behavior of the past is a matter particularly difficult to link tightly to observational 
evidence, but cannibalism on the part of some prehistoric 
native Americans has recently been claimed on the basis of chemical 
analysis of their preserved feces (Wilford 2000). 
 
In any of the sorts of cases I have described, research on both rival 
theories will be required if we are to determine what further empirical 
consequences each has and how to test those predictions. If Haack’s 
claim is that during this period of research everyone should remain agnostic 
about which, if either, of the two theories is true, then CE agrees 
(though that is because, according to CE, we should always remain agnostic 
about that). However, to demand that no scientist work with either 
theory would make advance on either of them impossible. And to 
demand that no scientist work on one theory to the exclusion of the 
other seems an unwarranted restriction on the division of labor. Further, 
though some scientists will be able to work on the development of 
both theories by keeping an open outlook, others will not find this psychologically 
sustainable. This tendency should not be viewed entirely 
as a weakness, either, because advocacy and competition can bring discoveries 
in ways that we should not want to impede. I conclude that it is 
not impermissible to adopt an attitude of advocacy, or what van Fraassen 
calls “commitment” or “acceptance” for one theory over another on the 
basis of social values in cases of epistemic tie. 
 
If we are ever to know whether two theories apparently equally supported 
for the status of empirically adequate are indeed both empirically 
adequate or rather empirically distinct, and even what their empirical 
import is, then the scientific community usually has to do more 
research, and it will be to the positive good of that research if some people 
make a commitment to one theory while others accept its rival, 
more to the good than if no one makes any such commitment. If the 
commitment is made on grounds of social preference, so be it. The fact 
that commitments to one or the other of the epistemically tied theories 
can serve the epistemic interests of science in the long run also addresses 
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the former objection, which worried that my view had trivialized the theory 
choice that is allowed to be made on the basis of social values. Here 
we see that not only can such a choice have social consequences but also 
making such a commitment at all to one or the other theory can serve 
the epistemic ends of science by motivating more research. 
 
The view I am sketching has the feature that we can acknowledge a 
legitimate role for social values in theory choice while not admitting 
that social preferences can be reasons to believe a theory true (or empirically 
adequate) and that we can do this without rejecting the distinction 
between facts and values, or between the contexts of discovery and 
justification, and without denying that theories have truth values. One 
may wonder, finally, whether the price of these features—features that I 
regard as advantageous—must be as extreme as some take antirealism to 
be. In particular, one may suspect that the epistemic tie situation in 
which I find a tiebreaker role for social values is a situation that the realist 
could find just as easily in any case where insufficient evidence is 
(roughly) equal for two rival theories. 
 
There remains a salient distinction between this and the antirealist’s 
tiebreaker situation. The antirealist’s tied theories can both be believed 
to have met all the antirealist’s epistemic goals, namely, empirical 
adequacy (and consistency and empirical strength), because it is 
possible for more than one theory to do all of these things. For the antirealist, 
an evidence tie can be an epistemic tie in the sense just described. 
In contrast, we can know a priori that it is not possible for the 
two theories to have met all of the realist’s epistemic goals, because no 
more than one theory can be true. For the realist, an evidentiary tie cannot 
be an epistemic tie in the sense I described for any theories that go 
beyond the observables, because such theories will make reference to 
unobservables, in the interesting cases they will differ in what they claim 
about unobservables, and which of two such theories is true is what it is 
the realist’s aim to find out. 
 
The realist’s aim is to believe the true theory, and it could not be 
right to believe true both of two distinct theories of the same subject 
matter. Thus, if we appealed to pragmatic factors as a tiebreaker in such 
a case, we would be illegitimately substituting pragmatic factors for 
missing evidence. Because the antirealist’s epistemic goals are more 
modest, it is possible for a full epistemic tie between two rival theories to 
arise, both in the sense that both theories in fact meet all epistemic 
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goals and, even more commonly, in the sense that we could have reason 
to believe that both meet our epistemic goals. This is why appeal to 
other kinds of reasons for theory choice is permissible for the antirealist. 
One may object to the steps I have just outlined: If we accept van 
Fraassen’s permissivist conception of rationality, according to which rationality 
rarely compels us to choose uniquely among possible beliefs 
and we are permitted to believe anything we are not rationally compelled 
to disbelieve, then why must we not admit that the realist can believe 
whichever of the two tied theories she likes better? (van Fraassen 
1989, 171ff.). Even though the realist knows both theories cannot be 
true, that does not mean neither can. Why is she not permitted to pick 
one, just like the antirealist? I think that we can be permissivists about 
rationality and still come to my conclusion that in the situations I have 
described, the constructive empiricist is in a position to appeal to social 
values for theory choice, whereas the realist is not. 
 
The issue for the claim I am making is not whether the realist is 
permitted to believe one of the tied theories. On the permissivist account, 
he is allowed, but what matters to my point is on what basis the 
realist or antirealist may believe or accept one of the two theories. Permissiveness 
about rationality will allow the realist to believe one of those 
two theories but only on the basis that nothing rationally compels him 
to reject it. This does not change the realist’s epistemic goal, a goal that 
makes evidence (broadly construed) the only sort of positive reason to 
believe a theory. One might put it this way: Permissiveness about rationality 
allows one to believe without a reason but does not change things 
in such a way that the realist may believe a theory citing his social values 
as the reason. This is because for the realist the choice of a theory is not 
a choice of which theory to accept but a choice of which theory to believe 
true. This is a purely epistemic goal, and pragmatic grounds for 
such a choice are inappropriate. 
 
Since in the case I have described, the realist definitely still has 
epistemic questions to address—those two theories cannot both be true, 
and truth is the epistemic goal—other sorts of positive reasons cannot 
decide between them because the realist has not discharged her epistemic 
duty. For the antirealist, when the two theories are tied, that does 
not mean she knows that both are empirically adequate; for any interesting 
theory, there is always evidence still out. Nevertheless, it is not irrational 
to believe that they are both empirically adequate on the basis 
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of evidence suggesting that, because it is possible that they are. (Here I 
not only acknowledge but also rely on permissiveness about rationality. 
7) And once one believes this, other sorts of reasons, pragmatic reasons, 
become legitimate positive reasons for choosing which theory to 
accept. The realist, by contrast, can never get to the point where other 
reasons become legitimate positive reasons for acceptance. This is because 
if the realist ever got to the point where she had discharged her 
epistemic duty, there would be only one theory left to choose from. 
 
What I should really say is that the realist can never get to this point 
where nonepistemic factors become positive reasons for theory choice 
unless that is where he started. I am assuming that both the constructive 
empiricist and the realist are committed to the priority of epistemic 
goals over pragmatic goals, and therefore epistemic criteria over pragmatic 
criteria, for theory acceptance. If we assume that both the constructive 
empiricist and the realist regard epistemic criteria as having to 
be satisfied before pragmatic criteria can become relevant, which I 
think is an assumption commonly made on either view when thinking 
of pure science, then the constructive empiricist can be let off the hook 
and allowed to consider pragmatic factors as relevant to theory choice, 
whereas the realist never can. Put differently, the constructive empiricist 
can allow pragmatic factors to affect theory choice while never giving 
up the priority of epistemic over pragmatic criteria, whereas the realist 
cannot. 
 
As I mentioned earlier, the constructive empiricist does not need 
an epistemic tie between two theories that both appear to be empirically 
adequate to be allowed to appeal to social values as a reason to accept a 
theory. Let us consider the worst possible case: The theory he favors is 
significantly less well confirmed than some rival; it is an epistemic dark 
horse. Let us assume, to make things cleaner, that his theory has no 
clear counterinstances. The darkness of its prospects comes simply from 
a lack of positive evidence or positive success. What may the realist do? 
What may the constructive empiricist do? 
 
If we assume the permissivist conception of rationality, the realist 
may believe the theory is true. What she may not do is believe it is true 
because of her social values. May her social values ever enter her choice 
of theories? Arguably not, stemming from the fact that her epistemic 
goal is to believe true theories, and I am taking epistemic goals to be primary 
for both the realist and the constructive empiricist. Permissively 
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speaking, the realist may believe the theory is true on slim positive evidence 
and for no other reason, but her epistemic task can never be believed 
to be done, except in a circumstance that leaves her with no 
more choices to make, that is, when she believes one theory to be true. 
Thus in the circumstance where the realist’s epistemic task is believed 
to be completed (for the moment), she is left with no more choices to 
make and so no choices to make on the basis of social values. 
 
The constructivist empiricist fares differently for reasons that are 
already familiar. Assuming permissiveness about rationality, when the 
constructive empiricist is faced with two theories and one has much 
more evidence, though neither is certainly falsified, he may believe that 
the one with less evidence is empirically adequate. Given that the other 
has more evidence, it would be odd, then, not to grant that it probably is 
empirically adequate, too. (If there is a reason not to grant that, then the 
constructive empiricist’s epistemic criteria would be enough for him to 
decide to accept the theory he likes, so it would not be a case of interest.) 
For the moment, then, his epistemic work is done, but he is still left 
with a choice because both theories are believed to meet his epistemic 
goals. So, he may choose which theory to accept on the basis of his social 
preferences. 
 
To recap, there is a way of accommodating the influence of social 
values on theory choice without falling into the fallacy Haack warns 
against, an option that is open to CE but not to realism. Is there any 
other strategy for achieving this end that a realist could accept? Of 
course, I do not know all the strategies that may be open to a realist, but 
I will close by discussing why I think one option that looks attractive is 
not successful. 
 
In this option, we accommodate Longino’s claim that social values 
are ineliminable from theory choice in science by granting that the role of 
social values is significant but maintaining that it should be, and largely 
is, played out entirely within the context of discovery. Such values will be 
among the things that lead people to articulate certain theories rather 
than others, but rigorous testing devoid of social values is the only way a 
choice to believe a theory true can be justified. Maintaining in this way 
that social values have no legitimate role in the context of justification 
sidesteps the Haack objection. Constructive empiricism has no reason I 
can see to give up the distinction between contexts of discovery and justification, 
but the view now under consideration has it that this distinction 
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all by itself can resolve the tension that I described CE as resolving, thus 
making antirealism unnecessary. There are signs in Longino’s text that 
she is confident that social values are ineliminable from the choice of 
auxiliaries only while a theory is under development, and they are encouraging 
for this proposal. After theories are developed, she admits, independent 
confirmation of auxiliaries is at least sometimes available 
(Longino 1990, 51–52). 
 
This strategy does not sit well with Longino’s dim view of the purported 
distinction between discovery and justification, but I think part 
of her disapproval can be addressed. It is true, as she points out, that 
the context of discovery has often been defined in terms of the psychological 
histories of individuals; through mysterious processes involving 
dreams, guesses, and other parts of mental life, people light on novel 
ideas (Longino 1990, 64–65). This is why the distinction is often assumed 
to run parallel to the distinction between psychology and logic. 
It tends to be assumed that the mental processes leading to discovery are 
randomizing because various and unknown. Longino is fully justified, I 
think, in complaining about this conception of the distinction, because 
to define it so is implicitly to deny that which ideas and theories come 
into existence tends to be systematically related to the culture, social 
structure, or socioeconomic interests of the context in which an individual 
scientist works. This is to deny something that is true, in the human 
sciences at least. 
 
However, the context of discovery can be defined in more careful 
terms: This is the context in which the genesis of ideas and theories 
takes place, the context composed of the causal or temporal history of 
the genesis of ideas and theories. The genesis of ideas has many aspects, 
including social ones; all aspects count. This account of the context of 
discovery allows us to reject as we should the presumption that the ideas 
and theories generated represent anything like a random sample of the 
possible ideas and theories. With this understanding of the distinction 
in mind, the proposal under consideration is this: that we regard the use 
of auxiliaries that have not yet been “directly” confirmed as something 
that takes place in the context of discovery. This means we require that 
auxiliaries be “directly” confirmed at some point, and we keep in mind 
that an auxiliary is not epistemically justified, and belief in any theory it 
is necessary to the confirmation of is not justified, until the auxiliary has 
been “directly” confirmed. 
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If Longino is right in her descriptive claims, then a theory’s auxiliaries 
often do not get “directly” confirmed until after at least the theory’s 
development. Those auxiliaries may not get scrutinized or justified, 
and hence the theory is not fully scrutinized or justified, until 
some time after the theory has taken on a certain life with the auxiliaries’ 
as yet unjustified help. This suggests an alternative diagnosis for 
cases in which social values have affected theory choice in science: Auxiliaries 
get used in the context of discovery (i.e., without “direct” confirmation) 
for so long and with such robust effect on the development of a 
theory that the attention a theory has received creates a presumption 
in the theory’s favor that is mistaken for epistemic warrant. This suggests 
that the best prescription for science is not to abandon the requirement 
that epistemic judgments be pure and primary but to reiterate the 
requirement that a theory not be considered justified until after its auxiliaries 
are “directly” confirmed. What Longino has observed, on this view, 
is people overstating their cases for their theories, a phenomenon we 
should speak out against and not condone. 
 
This warning not to regard a theory as justified until its auxiliaries 
are “directly” confirmed, regardless of the attention it has received, is 
reminiscent of Haack’s insistence that when “available evidence is not 
sufficient to decide between rival theories . . . [t]he proper response is 
that, unless and until more evidence is available, scientists had better 
suspend judgment” (Haack 1993a, 35). However, the strategy just described 
that Haack’s stricture here seems to be allied with fails to resolve 
the problem at hand: If we refrain from regarding a theory as justified, it 
does not follow, as this view needs to assume it does, that everything that 
happens concerning that theory is rightly assigned to the context of discovery. 
 
First, there obviously exist questions of legitimacy about a theory, 
even when we are not at the point of choosing whether to believe 
that it is thoroughly epistemically justified. Second, we give answers, 
even positive answers, to questions of justification, even when the answers 
are not full-blown belief that a theory is true, and we are obligated 
to give these provisional answers to evaluative questions about a theory’s 
prospects as we understand them. The context of justification is not the 
context merely of the justified. 
 
This is because development of theories is not blind to justificatory 
questions about the theories’ worth. It could not afford to be because 
development requires resources, and resources must be differentially 
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allocated due to their scarcity. Moreover, judgments about allocation of 
resources for development of theories often have to be made on the basis 
of slim positive evidence; following the recommendation to suspend 
all judgment in such cases would close down science, and refraining 
from regarding a theory as fully justified in such a case is good but irrelevant 
to the evaluative questions we do need to answer. (We can even 
imagine a case where a judgment is necessary despite the slim evidence 
for two theories being tied, simply by imagining that developing either 
at all would require more than half of the available resources.) It is thus 
no surprise that explicit arguments about the prospects and worth of a 
project are demanded of scientists who seek funding even for development 
of a theory. The winning theories are judged to be to some degree, 
in some way, more justified than their competitors, and their consequent 
ability to be developed due to the funding won is an indication of 
that judgment. 
 
It is wrong to think that there is no justificatory question that we ask 
or answer except the question whether a theory is fully justified and thus 
mistaken to think that development of theories is an activity that can be 
assigned completely or even primarily to the context of discovery. The 
context of discovery is a place where things just happen. Development 
of theories is not something that just happens. To think so looks like a 
way of sweeping under the rug decisions that require justification. Thus, 
the strategy open to the realist of acknowledging social values by confining 
them to the context of discovery is unsuccessful. Constructive empiricism, 
by contrast, allows social values to be answers to justificatory 
questions about which theory to choose. The questions are not epistemic, 
but they do not have to be. 
 
Notes 
 
1. Constructive empiricism is a restricted form of realism because it grants that theories 
have truth values and takes the aim of science to be finding theories that fit the truth 
about observables. I have called it antirealism in recognition of the fact that many realists 
wouldn’t regard this much of their doctrine as worthy of the name. 
 
2. I say there is “at most” one true theory to accommodate the possibility that the 
true view cannot be expressed in what we regard as a theory. If the truth about observables 
could not be expressed in a theory, then there would also not be many theories that are 
empirically adequate, which is why I say there are “potentially” many such theories. 
 
3. I am using the terms hypothesis and theory interchangeably. 
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4. “Direct confirmation” in Longino’s usage does not appear to require independence 
from all theory, only independence from the influence of social values and freedom 
from the regress that threatens once we take the role of auxiliary assumptions into 
account. 
 
5. Discussion at conference “Value-Free Science: Ideal or Illusion?” in Birmingham, 
Alabama, February 2001. 
 
6. Though this will not be the basis of my argument, note that a theory is always 
epistemically tied with its notational variants, but that does not mean we refrain from using 
any of these theories. 
 
7. I seem to rely on a strong dose of it: One might object that we know a priori that 
the probability of our coming up with two empirically adequate theories for a domain is 
nearly zero. We may think this, but it is too speculative to be compelling. Given permissiveness, 
it is enough if the antirealist does not have compelling reasons to think the two 
theories in question are empirically inequivalent, which he often will not when they are 
under development or nonmathematical. 
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